Here’s a quote from a
recent op-ed about Peter Theil and the US presidential election:
My guess, based on zero data, is that, had I mentioned Peter Thiel one year ago, only a handful of readers would have recognized his name. And, had I told you that he was one of the founders of Paypal and the first investor in Facebook (he’s even portrayed briefly in The Social Network), my guess, again based on zero data, is that your opinion of him would have instantly improved. “Tell us more about this Thiel,” you would say.
Forget about Peter Thiel and Donald Trump for a moment, and
just pay attention to the phrasing in that passage. The author uses the phrase “based
on zero data” not once, but twice. Of course, substantiating the author’s “guess”
with empirical research is a pretty silly concept. It’s not relevant to the thrust
of the article. I choose to highlight it here, however, because it reveals
something about our modern perspectives. In a bygone era, an author might have
chosen to say “I suspect,” or “I’d wager,” or “I’d venture to guess…” but
today, this author – along with many people out there – choose to stipulate
that they are saying so in spite of not
having analyzed the matter empirically.
The implication here is that analyzing the data is the conceptual
default. Welcome to the modern age. We are all data analysts now. The question
from here is how we can expect this fact to color our perspectives.
Recently, someone on my Facebook feed made a jibe at a
certain kind of person for believing a certain kind of thing about the Cold
War. The jibe was that sociologists should study why that certain kind of
person had reached a certain kind of conclusion, followed by a very
ideologically charged epithet for the Soviet Union. Because I happen to know
people were alive during the Cold War who grew up in countries that benefitted
from Soviet foreign policy, and because I happen to believe that Westerners do
not have the total story regarding Soviet foreign policy, I added a comment on
Facebook suggesting that the hypothetical sociologist should include the perspectives
of residents of the Third World.
This comment resulted in immediate demands for which people,
which country, which events, I was thinking of. Naturally, I avoided naming
specifics – not because I couldn’t give them, but because I didn’t want a
debate about the merits of a particular Cold War policy to distract from my
real point, which is that one’s perspective on the Cold War is invariably
shaped by which narrative one most identifies with. In the US, we’re accustomed
to thinking of the USSR as an “Evil Empire.” In the Third World, the question
really comes down to which major world superpower had the biggest impact on one’s
country – and was that impact positive or negative? This is why Nelson Mandela
famously chose to work with the USSR despite Western objections, because the
Soviet Union had helped Mandela’s cause when no one else would. You could argue
that Mandela was a communist and the Soviet Union helped him only for that
reason, but again this really only distracts from my point. My point is that
the USSR wasn’t a villain to everyone. Anyone interested in a complete history
of the Cold War ought to do a proper accounting of everything.
But my point fell on deaf ears because all anyone could do
was demand which country, which events – empirics, empirics, empirics. Let’s
see the data and analyze it. Hand it over. This speaks to the core cognitive problem
we face today: we approach everything as though we are data analysts. That
makes us very good at solving problems that can be solved by data analysis; it
makes us horrible at solving other kinds of problems.
Similarly, I came across a recent Facebook post (a public
one, so feel free to hunt it down if you’re so inclined) by Less Wrong religious leader Eliezer
Yudkowsky, arguing that everyone should vote for Hillary Clinton because the downside
risk of a Donald Trump presidency is World War 3. That’s not an exaggeration –
that really and truly is what Yudkowsky said. Of course, the reality is that
World War 3 may happen – or not – regardless of which candidate wins the
election. The only reason Yudkowsky counts this as a risk of a Trump
presidency, and not a Clinton presidency, is because Yudkowsky is biased. This should be perfectly clear because, as I
just said, World War 3 can happen under any set of assumptions; Yudkowsky only
includes that set of assumptions in his estimation of a Trump presidency.
But, remember, this is how Bayesian reasoning works.
Yudkowsky is willing to bet on WW3 + Trump, and unwilling to bet on WW3 +
Clinton; ergo, it is more probable until he decides to “update his priors.” He
thinks it, therefore it is. Now we can finally see that Bayesian reasoning,
when done incorrectly, is basically magical thinking.
Bayesian reasoning done
correctly, however, can be a powerful way to solve statistical and
machine-learning problems. In other words, it’s good at solving data analysis
problems, but bad at solving foreign policy problems. As you can see, the
problem runs deep.
It gets worse: A common trope among the libertarian crowd is
that voting is ineffectual on the margin, thus it doesn’t matter whether or not
you vote. But, if everyone acted on this information simultaneously, then no
one would vote and the thesis would invalidate itself. So this notion is
actually a paradox: completely meaningless, utter nonsense. Voting is
marginally ineffectual because voting itself is effectual. Similarly, profits
are maximized when the marginal profit of the next unit is zero. It would be
stupid to say that “producing gallons of milk is a waste of time” just because we’ve
reached the point of diminishing marginal benefit. But when we’re stuck
analyzing problems from a data analysis mindset, we undermine our ability to
solve problems through other means.
And that’s just politics.
Think about all the other areas of our lives that are surely suffering due to the
fact that we’re stuck in a data analysis paradigm.
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