Enjoy.
2013-07-05
Insipid Pop Weekend
Remember when I cooked up the idea of Insipid Pop Weekend? Far be it from me to leave you hanging. Here's the third installment. (Actually, this one is a couple of years old now.)
Enjoy.
Enjoy.
If Anti-Immigration Isn't Racism, Then Someone Make An Argument For It That Isn't Racist
Simon Grey provides what I consider to be the classic racist (forgive me, Simon) argument against open borders:
To wit: Let's say there are cultural differences between the two countries, but the major reason why Mexicans want to immigrate to the United States is because a natural disaster has wiped out most of their homeland. (Think of the many Pakistani emigrants, for example, who fled across borders when their homes were flooded in 2010.) In that case, everyone agrees with Grey's (a) and (b), and yet neither of those facts informs the immigration issue whatsoever.
Tellingly, Grey counts "government corruption" as a cultural deficiency, which perhaps it is, but certainly one that the United States shares. (If his claim is that the US government is merely less corrupt than the Mexican government, I would love to see some evidence for this claim.)
Thus, this tendency to believe that the "cultural differences" that exist between nations are predominantly bad among nations experiencing emigration, and predominantly good among nations experiencing immigration is a fundamentally ethnocentric belief. (And most of us agree that ethnocentrism is racism - feel free to disagree in the comments.)
This idea implies that those countries which have the highest rates of immigration must be culturally superior. It also implies that any American who immigrates to, say, Singapore does so because he or she feels that Singapore is culturally superior to the United States. Or how about people who retire in Panama to enjoy the nice weather and attractive scenery. Are they counting Panama as culturally preferable to the United States? Would anyone ever seriously make claims of this kind?
I'm not suggesting that no one ever immigrates for this reason, but to hear Simon Grey tell it (or Sonic Charmer, or any of the people either of them link to on immigration issues), it is the major factor. In truth, this concept is all in their heads. They see the United States as having cultural advantages to Mexico, thus they believe that all or most of the reasons people immigrate from Mexico are rooted in culture.
White Man's Burden, anyone?
Am I suggesting that there are no cultural reasons for disparate national incomes whatsoever? Of course not. There are many diverse reasons why people choose to leave one nation behind in order to build a new life in another country. Most predominantly, those reasons are economic, not cultural, hence we observe that many immigrants come to the United States yet still maintain strong cultural ties to their homeland.
There is another reason why Mexicans come to the United States and not, say, France. (For all I know, Grey may also believe that France is culturally inferior to the United States, but for the moment let's appeal to Grey's foot note, which states "The general point of this point will stand if you substitute any other country name in place of either 'Mexico' or 'America.'" The reason is that immigration restrictions are higher in France. They are also higher in the United Kingdom, in Singapore, in Germany, and in most other wealthy, culturally dominant nations.
See, emigrants follow the money, but only so far as they can actually follow it. US immigration policy - as closed as it is - is relatively open on a national scale, so "Mexicans" immigrate "here," rather than "there." This fact seriously undermines Grey's cultural superiority narrative because it reveals that one of the primary factors determining human migratory patterns have more to do with legal structure than cultural anything. I suspect the reason Simon Grey fails to pick up on this is because has never actually attempted to emigrate anywhere. Others have.
But to the anti-immigration bloggers out there, every difference is a cultural one. There is no other imaginable explanation. Every conceivable reason why Tamerlan Tsarnaev ended up in Boston instead of Berlin relates to the cultural superiority of the United States.
This is a complete and utter cognitive failure.
Grey provides a view even further into the void:
But forget about the weakness of his theory. To the likes of Simon Grey and Sonic Charmer, those of us who disagree with him also belong to a different culture, an "essentially progressive" one. If you don't automatically think that economic hardship is caused by cultural disparity, then you're one of "them," the ones who "accept cultural relativism" and who "deny that culture... and perhaps even race/genetics" has any bearing on differences whatsoever.
In other words, culture either tells the whole story, or you're one of those dumb people who thinks it makes no difference whatsoever. Incredibly, Grey caps off his dissection of the issue by remarking that for those who disagree with him, "nuance and broadness is not exactly their strong suit." Very rich, Mr. Grey.
I would like to believe that such ideas aren't just tribalism and racism. But if they aren't, then they need to be justified on something other than racist terms. Jumping willy-nilly from "there are cultural differences" to "and that's why Mexicans move to the United States" is at best sloppy and poorly reasoned. But at worst, it's racism.
Any honest person, in answering these questions, would have to come to the conclusions that a) there are differences between America and Mexico and b) some of those differences are cultural. Moreover, the solution(s) to Mexico’s apparent cultural deficiencies are not easily forthcoming (eg. ending government corruption in Mexico in, say, 10 years would be a miracle unto itself).Everyone in their right mind agrees with Simon's (a) and (b), but Grey has failed to include his point (c), which is both implied and taken for granted. If Grey had stated his point (c), it would read something like this: (c) These cultural deficiencies are the primary reason Mexicans want to immigrate to the United States. I could further elaborate on a few implied points about that, but they are not necessary for me to make my point.
To wit: Let's say there are cultural differences between the two countries, but the major reason why Mexicans want to immigrate to the United States is because a natural disaster has wiped out most of their homeland. (Think of the many Pakistani emigrants, for example, who fled across borders when their homes were flooded in 2010.) In that case, everyone agrees with Grey's (a) and (b), and yet neither of those facts informs the immigration issue whatsoever.
Tellingly, Grey counts "government corruption" as a cultural deficiency, which perhaps it is, but certainly one that the United States shares. (If his claim is that the US government is merely less corrupt than the Mexican government, I would love to see some evidence for this claim.)
Thus, this tendency to believe that the "cultural differences" that exist between nations are predominantly bad among nations experiencing emigration, and predominantly good among nations experiencing immigration is a fundamentally ethnocentric belief. (And most of us agree that ethnocentrism is racism - feel free to disagree in the comments.)
This idea implies that those countries which have the highest rates of immigration must be culturally superior. It also implies that any American who immigrates to, say, Singapore does so because he or she feels that Singapore is culturally superior to the United States. Or how about people who retire in Panama to enjoy the nice weather and attractive scenery. Are they counting Panama as culturally preferable to the United States? Would anyone ever seriously make claims of this kind?
I'm not suggesting that no one ever immigrates for this reason, but to hear Simon Grey tell it (or Sonic Charmer, or any of the people either of them link to on immigration issues), it is the major factor. In truth, this concept is all in their heads. They see the United States as having cultural advantages to Mexico, thus they believe that all or most of the reasons people immigrate from Mexico are rooted in culture.
White Man's Burden, anyone?
Am I suggesting that there are no cultural reasons for disparate national incomes whatsoever? Of course not. There are many diverse reasons why people choose to leave one nation behind in order to build a new life in another country. Most predominantly, those reasons are economic, not cultural, hence we observe that many immigrants come to the United States yet still maintain strong cultural ties to their homeland.
There is another reason why Mexicans come to the United States and not, say, France. (For all I know, Grey may also believe that France is culturally inferior to the United States, but for the moment let's appeal to Grey's foot note, which states "The general point of this point will stand if you substitute any other country name in place of either 'Mexico' or 'America.'" The reason is that immigration restrictions are higher in France. They are also higher in the United Kingdom, in Singapore, in Germany, and in most other wealthy, culturally dominant nations.
See, emigrants follow the money, but only so far as they can actually follow it. US immigration policy - as closed as it is - is relatively open on a national scale, so "Mexicans" immigrate "here," rather than "there." This fact seriously undermines Grey's cultural superiority narrative because it reveals that one of the primary factors determining human migratory patterns have more to do with legal structure than cultural anything. I suspect the reason Simon Grey fails to pick up on this is because has never actually attempted to emigrate anywhere. Others have.
But to the anti-immigration bloggers out there, every difference is a cultural one. There is no other imaginable explanation. Every conceivable reason why Tamerlan Tsarnaev ended up in Boston instead of Berlin relates to the cultural superiority of the United States.
This is a complete and utter cognitive failure.
Grey provides a view even further into the void:
First, some open-borders libertarians are simply reformed progressives; they defend a sort of anarchist definition of freedom, but still hew to an essentially progressive worldview, one that accepts basic progressive tenets. Thus, they accept cultural relativism, and must therefore deny that culture (and perhaps even race/genetics) has any bearing on any differences whatsoever, and therefore defend open borders since it doesn’t offend their moral sensibilities. These people are basically SWPLs without the corresponding desire to “help” the less fortunate.There can't be more to economic disparity than culture, no, it's just that our moral sensibilities are offended. That is a mighty large slack variable.
But forget about the weakness of his theory. To the likes of Simon Grey and Sonic Charmer, those of us who disagree with him also belong to a different culture, an "essentially progressive" one. If you don't automatically think that economic hardship is caused by cultural disparity, then you're one of "them," the ones who "accept cultural relativism" and who "deny that culture... and perhaps even race/genetics" has any bearing on differences whatsoever.
In other words, culture either tells the whole story, or you're one of those dumb people who thinks it makes no difference whatsoever. Incredibly, Grey caps off his dissection of the issue by remarking that for those who disagree with him, "nuance and broadness is not exactly their strong suit." Very rich, Mr. Grey.
I would like to believe that such ideas aren't just tribalism and racism. But if they aren't, then they need to be justified on something other than racist terms. Jumping willy-nilly from "there are cultural differences" to "and that's why Mexicans move to the United States" is at best sloppy and poorly reasoned. But at worst, it's racism.
2013-07-04
2013-07-03
Cognition And Music Appreciation
Part of the reason people have such strong opinions about music is that, when it is heard, it is very difficult to ignore. That might be because it engages multiple regions of the brain, or it might be due to the fact that sound carries special weight in the human brain for evolutionary reasons. Euphony might signal safety while cacophony might signal danger, for example. I have blogged about this before.
We can imagine a continuum along which there are two poles, representing absolute simplicity versus total complexity. If we accept the full audible sonic spectrum, then on one side of the continuum, we have a single sound. On the other side of the continuum, we have every imaginable sound played all at once. Essentially, on one side, we have literal monotony, and on the other side, we have white noise. Between those two extremes, we have every combination of sounds the human ear can conceivably hear.
According to this idea, music is a subset of that continuum. On the simple side of the music continuum, we have a single note, either sustained indefinitely or played repeatedly; on the complex side, we have an elaborate amalgamation of notes and rhythms that is so complex that it is impossible for the mind to unravel.
With that continuum in mind, let's consider a series of assertions.
Assertion #1: Both Poles Of The Music Continuum Are Annoying
The reason those buzzing alarm clocks wake you up is because the sound they make is annoying. That sound is identical to the "simple" extreme on the music continuum. Few of us can be subjected to that noise for an extended period of time without going crazy.
Similarly, very complex examples of 20th Century atonal music, featuring many overlapping and tonally unrelated sounds, might be the closest thing we have to the "complex" extreme. Unsurprisingly, we also find that the vast majority of human beings grow irritable upon hearing that music, at least for an extended period of time. Even the members of the unannoyed minority would find it difficult to listen to, say, five such pieces played simultaneously.
Thus we see that there is a limit to the level of simplicity, and a limit to the level of complexity, human brains are capable of tolerating in music before they grow irritable.
Assertion #2: Music Gets More Pleasing Once We Move Away From The Poles
Even a repetitive piece of music like a cell phone ringtone is sufficiently repetitive to annoy most people. But it is much less annoying than a buzzing alarm clock. Therefore, as we add small increments of complexity, we eventually move along the continuum to a sufficient degree that we arrive at the lower bound of what we might call "tolerable music."
Similarly, as we strip away elements of a complex piece, we begin to arrive at a point where relationships between notes and sounds can be formed in terms of harmony and rhythm. The point at which every sound we hear makes some sort of musical sense is the upper bound of what we are calling "tolerable music."
Thus, the continuum that runs from the lower bound to the upper bound represents the full spectrum of music we are willing to tolerate.
Assertion #3: Different People Have Different Lower and Upper Bounds
Uncontroversially, it can be noted by mere observation that different people have different levels of tolerance when it comes to the upper and lower bounds. For some, 20th Century atonal music is absolutely intolerable, while for others it offers a highly stimulating listening experience. "The Song That Doesn't End" is enough to drive many people crazy; but kids really seem to like it.
Hopefully this suffices to establish that at which points people end up setting their upper and lower bounds for "tolerable music" is dependent on the individual hearing the music. Tastes vary by individual. No two people have exactly the same taste in music.
Assertion #4: The Location Of Lower And Upper Bounds Is A Function Of Cognitive Ability
If you teach a child a simple melody, that child will play that melody over and over again until he or she has driven you nuts. That child has a higher tolerance for simple, repetitive melodies than you have. In terms of our continuum, the child's lower bound is at a point closer to the "simplicity pole" than your lower bound is.
Similarly, a music novice of any age will tend to have a higher tolerance for simplicity than a veteran musician, because the novice cannot yet understand very complex music - due to a combination of lack of exposure and lack of the necessary theoretical fundamentals - while music that is more appropriate for beginners will fail to captivate the veteran, and relatively more complex pieces will give the veteran better audio stimulation and a richer experience.
The range of music compositions we find pleasing enough to listen to without getting annoyed, therefore, is a function of a person's cognitive ability to process those sounds.
Conclusion
Of course, musical cognition is not purely a function of age or intelligence. One cannot know everything about everything, so it is quite common to encounter brilliant physicists who prefer Bruce Springstein to Frank Zappa or Rhodes Scholars who prefer Bob Dylan to Gentle Giant. Even among musicians themselves, some very experienced ones will not put in the work required to gain an appreciation for very complicated music, while others are so accustomed to hearing complicated music that they become intolerant of anything they understand too easily.
I wrote this post this morning to explore what I believe to be one of the most important factors determining how "annoying" a person considers music to be. I am always surprised at the froth and vitriol with which people express distaste for a piece of music, and that vitriol seems to be out-of-proportion to the fact that all that is being reacted to someone else's artistic expression.
My point is that the continuum is established by the individual's actual cognition. We have a tendency to over-emphasize the role "emotion" plays in music appreciation. I don't deny that it does, but I would suggest that cognitive intolerance rules out certain sounds before a person ever has a chance to assess the merits of those sounds on an emotional level.
Once the "annoying music" has been cognitively omitted from consideration, though, each individual has many reasons to appreciate any particular piece of music. Some of those reasons are emotional, some are academic, and some are multi-faceted and difficult to explain.
We can imagine a continuum along which there are two poles, representing absolute simplicity versus total complexity. If we accept the full audible sonic spectrum, then on one side of the continuum, we have a single sound. On the other side of the continuum, we have every imaginable sound played all at once. Essentially, on one side, we have literal monotony, and on the other side, we have white noise. Between those two extremes, we have every combination of sounds the human ear can conceivably hear.
According to this idea, music is a subset of that continuum. On the simple side of the music continuum, we have a single note, either sustained indefinitely or played repeatedly; on the complex side, we have an elaborate amalgamation of notes and rhythms that is so complex that it is impossible for the mind to unravel.
With that continuum in mind, let's consider a series of assertions.
Assertion #1: Both Poles Of The Music Continuum Are Annoying
The reason those buzzing alarm clocks wake you up is because the sound they make is annoying. That sound is identical to the "simple" extreme on the music continuum. Few of us can be subjected to that noise for an extended period of time without going crazy.
Similarly, very complex examples of 20th Century atonal music, featuring many overlapping and tonally unrelated sounds, might be the closest thing we have to the "complex" extreme. Unsurprisingly, we also find that the vast majority of human beings grow irritable upon hearing that music, at least for an extended period of time. Even the members of the unannoyed minority would find it difficult to listen to, say, five such pieces played simultaneously.
Thus we see that there is a limit to the level of simplicity, and a limit to the level of complexity, human brains are capable of tolerating in music before they grow irritable.
Assertion #2: Music Gets More Pleasing Once We Move Away From The Poles
Even a repetitive piece of music like a cell phone ringtone is sufficiently repetitive to annoy most people. But it is much less annoying than a buzzing alarm clock. Therefore, as we add small increments of complexity, we eventually move along the continuum to a sufficient degree that we arrive at the lower bound of what we might call "tolerable music."
Similarly, as we strip away elements of a complex piece, we begin to arrive at a point where relationships between notes and sounds can be formed in terms of harmony and rhythm. The point at which every sound we hear makes some sort of musical sense is the upper bound of what we are calling "tolerable music."
Thus, the continuum that runs from the lower bound to the upper bound represents the full spectrum of music we are willing to tolerate.
Assertion #3: Different People Have Different Lower and Upper Bounds
Uncontroversially, it can be noted by mere observation that different people have different levels of tolerance when it comes to the upper and lower bounds. For some, 20th Century atonal music is absolutely intolerable, while for others it offers a highly stimulating listening experience. "The Song That Doesn't End" is enough to drive many people crazy; but kids really seem to like it.
Hopefully this suffices to establish that at which points people end up setting their upper and lower bounds for "tolerable music" is dependent on the individual hearing the music. Tastes vary by individual. No two people have exactly the same taste in music.
Assertion #4: The Location Of Lower And Upper Bounds Is A Function Of Cognitive Ability
If you teach a child a simple melody, that child will play that melody over and over again until he or she has driven you nuts. That child has a higher tolerance for simple, repetitive melodies than you have. In terms of our continuum, the child's lower bound is at a point closer to the "simplicity pole" than your lower bound is.
Similarly, a music novice of any age will tend to have a higher tolerance for simplicity than a veteran musician, because the novice cannot yet understand very complex music - due to a combination of lack of exposure and lack of the necessary theoretical fundamentals - while music that is more appropriate for beginners will fail to captivate the veteran, and relatively more complex pieces will give the veteran better audio stimulation and a richer experience.
The range of music compositions we find pleasing enough to listen to without getting annoyed, therefore, is a function of a person's cognitive ability to process those sounds.
Conclusion
Of course, musical cognition is not purely a function of age or intelligence. One cannot know everything about everything, so it is quite common to encounter brilliant physicists who prefer Bruce Springstein to Frank Zappa or Rhodes Scholars who prefer Bob Dylan to Gentle Giant. Even among musicians themselves, some very experienced ones will not put in the work required to gain an appreciation for very complicated music, while others are so accustomed to hearing complicated music that they become intolerant of anything they understand too easily.
I wrote this post this morning to explore what I believe to be one of the most important factors determining how "annoying" a person considers music to be. I am always surprised at the froth and vitriol with which people express distaste for a piece of music, and that vitriol seems to be out-of-proportion to the fact that all that is being reacted to someone else's artistic expression.
My point is that the continuum is established by the individual's actual cognition. We have a tendency to over-emphasize the role "emotion" plays in music appreciation. I don't deny that it does, but I would suggest that cognitive intolerance rules out certain sounds before a person ever has a chance to assess the merits of those sounds on an emotional level.
Once the "annoying music" has been cognitively omitted from consideration, though, each individual has many reasons to appreciate any particular piece of music. Some of those reasons are emotional, some are academic, and some are multi-faceted and difficult to explain.
2013-07-02
Happiness As A Set Of Time Constraints
We all want what is best for us, individually.
In the material sense, this means that we all want all of our own material desires to be fully satisfied. There are only two kinds of people who ever succeed in this, however: Bajillionaires and hippies. Bajillionaires are able to accomplish this because they have more productive capability than desires. Hippies are able to accomplish this because they have fewer desires than they have productive capacity. (By analogy, there are two ways to avoid losing a footrace: by running faster than everyone else in the race, or by choosing not to run the race at all.)
In the philosophical or spiritual sense, this means that we all want to achieve a state of perfect knowledge or spiritual fulfillment. There are only two kinds of people who succeed in this: Geniuses and fools. Like bajillionaires, geniuses have more ability than they have want. Like hippies, fools have fewer wants than abilities in the intellectual sphere.
We can continue listing out the various kinds of utility and making the same observation again and again. The only people who will ever be satisfied in love are either those who greatly excel in their ability to love, and those who require very little love to be satisfied. The only people who will ever be satisfied in art are brilliant artists and people who are easily impressed by anything called "art." And so on...
In every aspect of life, "satisfaction" ultimately comes down to either being able to achieve everything you want, or to want far less than you could ever hope to achieve. None of us will never be able to satisfy all of our desires through pure productive capacity, because the time required to satisfy all material desires is so great that we are left with too little time to satisfy all artistic, spiritual, relationship desires, and so forth.
So we humans have developed many silly intellectual frameworks the purpose of which is to justify preferential treatment of one particular aspect of life. The principle of "enlightened self-interest" serves to justify a preference toward material desires and wealth-generation. The purpose of organized religion is to justify a preference toward satisfaction of spiritual desires. The purpose of romanticism is to justify a preference toward love. The purpose of Bohemianism is to justify artistic lifestyles. The list goes on.
Each framework exposes us to a different kind of poverty. Devoting yourself to one framework or another will result in feeling empty in other aspects of your life.
Therefore, the best approaches are those that result in something other than poverty. Even an utter lack of philosophy or intellectual frameworks will produce a better outcome than being overly dedicated to religion, money, or etc. This is why "the masses" are generally much happier than the more thoughtful people who spend a lot of time anguishing over the fact that the world would be a better place if people were more spiritual, or creative, or ambitious, or had a greater capacity for love, and so on.
The real key to happiness is finding an acceptable balance among all your competing desires. If the one and only thing that will ever make you happy is to be, say, a great painter, then you should certainly dedicate your life to being a great painter. But if you can live with being merely a good painter, then that frees up some of your time to earn more money, have more satisfying personal relationships, learn more about science, have a healthier body, or whatever else might make you happy. This, of course, assumes that you can also be satisfied with less than pure bliss in those other areas as well.
In the material sense, this means that we all want all of our own material desires to be fully satisfied. There are only two kinds of people who ever succeed in this, however: Bajillionaires and hippies. Bajillionaires are able to accomplish this because they have more productive capability than desires. Hippies are able to accomplish this because they have fewer desires than they have productive capacity. (By analogy, there are two ways to avoid losing a footrace: by running faster than everyone else in the race, or by choosing not to run the race at all.)
In the philosophical or spiritual sense, this means that we all want to achieve a state of perfect knowledge or spiritual fulfillment. There are only two kinds of people who succeed in this: Geniuses and fools. Like bajillionaires, geniuses have more ability than they have want. Like hippies, fools have fewer wants than abilities in the intellectual sphere.
We can continue listing out the various kinds of utility and making the same observation again and again. The only people who will ever be satisfied in love are either those who greatly excel in their ability to love, and those who require very little love to be satisfied. The only people who will ever be satisfied in art are brilliant artists and people who are easily impressed by anything called "art." And so on...
In every aspect of life, "satisfaction" ultimately comes down to either being able to achieve everything you want, or to want far less than you could ever hope to achieve. None of us will never be able to satisfy all of our desires through pure productive capacity, because the time required to satisfy all material desires is so great that we are left with too little time to satisfy all artistic, spiritual, relationship desires, and so forth.
So we humans have developed many silly intellectual frameworks the purpose of which is to justify preferential treatment of one particular aspect of life. The principle of "enlightened self-interest" serves to justify a preference toward material desires and wealth-generation. The purpose of organized religion is to justify a preference toward satisfaction of spiritual desires. The purpose of romanticism is to justify a preference toward love. The purpose of Bohemianism is to justify artistic lifestyles. The list goes on.
Each framework exposes us to a different kind of poverty. Devoting yourself to one framework or another will result in feeling empty in other aspects of your life.
Therefore, the best approaches are those that result in something other than poverty. Even an utter lack of philosophy or intellectual frameworks will produce a better outcome than being overly dedicated to religion, money, or etc. This is why "the masses" are generally much happier than the more thoughtful people who spend a lot of time anguishing over the fact that the world would be a better place if people were more spiritual, or creative, or ambitious, or had a greater capacity for love, and so on.
The real key to happiness is finding an acceptable balance among all your competing desires. If the one and only thing that will ever make you happy is to be, say, a great painter, then you should certainly dedicate your life to being a great painter. But if you can live with being merely a good painter, then that frees up some of your time to earn more money, have more satisfying personal relationships, learn more about science, have a healthier body, or whatever else might make you happy. This, of course, assumes that you can also be satisfied with less than pure bliss in those other areas as well.
2013-07-01
Does Reality Exist?
To question reality is to make the most amateurish mistake in all of philosophy. The question itself is meaningless. I will now illustrate why.
1.
First, let's establish that "reality" is, by definition, that which actually exists objectively. You can compare it to "perception," which is that which seems to exist, based on our own ability to experience it via some combination of the five senses and true-and-valid logic.
Thus, the real question is: How do we know that which we perceive truly represents reality?
To answer this question, we merely have to observe that every new piece of knowledge you acquire changes your perception of reality. Whenever you receive any new piece of information, either by perceiving a new experience or engaging in irrefutable logic, your understanding of the world around you becomes more accurate. (Here, I assume that "information" is true. False beliefs will also change your perception for the worse, but that fact is irrelevant to the topic of today's blog post.)
2.
Because every new piece of knowledge improves the accuracy of your perceptions, then it is obvious that one will only ever perceive reality when one possesses all knowledge, i.e. when one is omniscient.
Does an omniscient being know what she will be doing in exactly 677 hours, 23 minutes, and 7 seconds from the present time? If not, then she is not omniscient. If so, then she is thus able to alter that event, which implies that that which she previously knew was not the truth; hence, she is not omniscient.
The truth is, omniscience is impossible. Obviously, everyone knows that they themselves will never be omniscient, but as I have just shown, omniscience itself does not exist. There is no such thing as knowing everything.
3.
If omniscience is impossible, then it is impossible to perceive reality. This does not imply that there is no reality. Nor does it imply that perception is reality. Instead, all we really know is that there is always a gap between our present knowledge and a state of total knowledge. And that is all we will ever know.
If the question is whether there is a difference between perception and reality, then we all know the answer: of course there is.
If the question is whether one, true, objective reality exists, then the question itself is meaningless. The word "reality" is basically defined to be that which really does exist in an objective way. So asking whether that which is defined to be true really is true is essentially questioning the definition of the word reality, or else the meaningfulness of it. Does the set of all knowledge which, by definition, is impossible to acquire actually exist?
4.
What does something that is invisible look like? What does a physical vacuum smell like? What happens at one degree less than 0 Kelvin? If the universe could view itself in a mirror, what would it look like?
All such questions seem interesting upon casual examination, but close examination reveals them all to be paradoxes. That is, they are meaningless by definition. That which is invisible cannot look like anything; if it could, then it would not be invisible. Vacuums smell like nothing, because vacuums are by definition states of nothingness; but more importantly, human olfactory sensation cannot exist in a state of nothingness, because our mere presence would alter the smell of the vacuum and render it no longer a vacuum. 0 Kelvin is defined to be the absence of temperature; there is no such thing as "negative existence;" there cannot be a -1 Kelvin. In order for the universe to see itself in a mirror, it would have to look through space and reflect light; since all space and light is contained within the universe, then it could never be seen in a mirror.
Again, all of these are merely questions in which the definition of something is assumed to be the opposite of its definition. In philosophy, we call these questions paradoxes.
Questioning reality is just another example of a paradox. It is not a clever question, it is a meaningless contradiction.
1.
First, let's establish that "reality" is, by definition, that which actually exists objectively. You can compare it to "perception," which is that which seems to exist, based on our own ability to experience it via some combination of the five senses and true-and-valid logic.
Thus, the real question is: How do we know that which we perceive truly represents reality?
To answer this question, we merely have to observe that every new piece of knowledge you acquire changes your perception of reality. Whenever you receive any new piece of information, either by perceiving a new experience or engaging in irrefutable logic, your understanding of the world around you becomes more accurate. (Here, I assume that "information" is true. False beliefs will also change your perception for the worse, but that fact is irrelevant to the topic of today's blog post.)
2.
Because every new piece of knowledge improves the accuracy of your perceptions, then it is obvious that one will only ever perceive reality when one possesses all knowledge, i.e. when one is omniscient.
Does an omniscient being know what she will be doing in exactly 677 hours, 23 minutes, and 7 seconds from the present time? If not, then she is not omniscient. If so, then she is thus able to alter that event, which implies that that which she previously knew was not the truth; hence, she is not omniscient.
The truth is, omniscience is impossible. Obviously, everyone knows that they themselves will never be omniscient, but as I have just shown, omniscience itself does not exist. There is no such thing as knowing everything.
3.
If omniscience is impossible, then it is impossible to perceive reality. This does not imply that there is no reality. Nor does it imply that perception is reality. Instead, all we really know is that there is always a gap between our present knowledge and a state of total knowledge. And that is all we will ever know.
If the question is whether there is a difference between perception and reality, then we all know the answer: of course there is.
If the question is whether one, true, objective reality exists, then the question itself is meaningless. The word "reality" is basically defined to be that which really does exist in an objective way. So asking whether that which is defined to be true really is true is essentially questioning the definition of the word reality, or else the meaningfulness of it. Does the set of all knowledge which, by definition, is impossible to acquire actually exist?
4.
What does something that is invisible look like? What does a physical vacuum smell like? What happens at one degree less than 0 Kelvin? If the universe could view itself in a mirror, what would it look like?
All such questions seem interesting upon casual examination, but close examination reveals them all to be paradoxes. That is, they are meaningless by definition. That which is invisible cannot look like anything; if it could, then it would not be invisible. Vacuums smell like nothing, because vacuums are by definition states of nothingness; but more importantly, human olfactory sensation cannot exist in a state of nothingness, because our mere presence would alter the smell of the vacuum and render it no longer a vacuum. 0 Kelvin is defined to be the absence of temperature; there is no such thing as "negative existence;" there cannot be a -1 Kelvin. In order for the universe to see itself in a mirror, it would have to look through space and reflect light; since all space and light is contained within the universe, then it could never be seen in a mirror.
Again, all of these are merely questions in which the definition of something is assumed to be the opposite of its definition. In philosophy, we call these questions paradoxes.
Questioning reality is just another example of a paradox. It is not a clever question, it is a meaningless contradiction.
2013-06-28
Making Bangladesh Suffer
I'll take a break from philosophy today and focus on the Obama Administration's recent decision to cut "trade benefits" (whatever those are) to Bangladesh. Reuters called the decision "mostly symbolic," but I wonder how symbolic Bangladeshi factory workers will feel that it is when their work decreases and they start to make less money.
Well, there are many false and idiotic reasons to restrict trade. I was curious which one Obama would decide to cite. He said, according to Reuters, "I have determined that it is appropriate to suspend Bangladesh ... because it is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers in the country."
People who subscribe to this viewpoint believe that two countries must not trade with each other unless the poorer country pays its workers "decent" wages under "decent" conditions, and so on. The question is, what is "decent?" In Italy, for example, workers earn lower wages than in the United States, but are they "decent" wages? At $14,000 per year, an Italian garment worker is at or below the US poverty line. Shall we eliminate trade benefits to Italy? And if not, what is the appropriate line to draw?
This argument does not end at the Bangladeshi or Italian borders. Factory workers in Kansas, after all, make lower wages than factory workers in New Jersey. If Obama cared about the wages and working conditions of factory workers, then he should also cut all trade benefits between Kansas and New Jersey unless and until factories in Kansas set their working conditions exactly in line with those in New Jersey. Does anyone actually believe reducing trade between US states would equalize wages and working conditions between them? Does anyone believe that we can make Mississippi a more wealthy state by doing less business with them?
Garments are produced in Bangladesh precisely because wages are lower there. If wages increase, there is no longer any reason for an international garment company to manufacture garments in Bangladesh at all; it would be cheaper to do it at home. It is not merely the cost of wages that goes into factory work, but also the shipping costs, the political costs (money paid to foreign governments to "grease the wheels" enough to clear the regulatory hurdles), the higher taxes paid to the foreign countries, and so on. Increase the total cost of business, and the dynamic changes for the company. They will simply close the factory doors and do their business elsewhere.
Considering the reality of the situation, which do you think is better for Bangladesh: Factories in which there may be questionable working conditions, or no factories at all?
Well, there are many false and idiotic reasons to restrict trade. I was curious which one Obama would decide to cite. He said, according to Reuters, "I have determined that it is appropriate to suspend Bangladesh ... because it is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers in the country."
People who subscribe to this viewpoint believe that two countries must not trade with each other unless the poorer country pays its workers "decent" wages under "decent" conditions, and so on. The question is, what is "decent?" In Italy, for example, workers earn lower wages than in the United States, but are they "decent" wages? At $14,000 per year, an Italian garment worker is at or below the US poverty line. Shall we eliminate trade benefits to Italy? And if not, what is the appropriate line to draw?
This argument does not end at the Bangladeshi or Italian borders. Factory workers in Kansas, after all, make lower wages than factory workers in New Jersey. If Obama cared about the wages and working conditions of factory workers, then he should also cut all trade benefits between Kansas and New Jersey unless and until factories in Kansas set their working conditions exactly in line with those in New Jersey. Does anyone actually believe reducing trade between US states would equalize wages and working conditions between them? Does anyone believe that we can make Mississippi a more wealthy state by doing less business with them?
Garments are produced in Bangladesh precisely because wages are lower there. If wages increase, there is no longer any reason for an international garment company to manufacture garments in Bangladesh at all; it would be cheaper to do it at home. It is not merely the cost of wages that goes into factory work, but also the shipping costs, the political costs (money paid to foreign governments to "grease the wheels" enough to clear the regulatory hurdles), the higher taxes paid to the foreign countries, and so on. Increase the total cost of business, and the dynamic changes for the company. They will simply close the factory doors and do their business elsewhere.
Considering the reality of the situation, which do you think is better for Bangladesh: Factories in which there may be questionable working conditions, or no factories at all?
2013-06-26
Lives That Could Have Been
Spend any time in downtown Denver during the summer, and you are sure to notice two important attributes of the city. The first is the large number of street kids. The second is the pianos.
The pianos were clearly some bureaucrat's idea of a downtown beautification project. They are old, upright pianos, brightly colored, positioned just far enough away from each other than the sound coming from one is inaudible to the person playing the next. There are signs urging the public to sit down and play.
In the early evening, during happy hour, there are exactly the kinds of people you might expect: Old, bearded has-beens who play "Piano Man," young hipsters trying to impress their dates with an introductory level knowledge of some recognizable Mozart themes, random people sheepishly poking at the keys to test whether or not the pianos are part of some marketing campaign, surprised that the pianos do, in fact work.
Later on, though, the street kids come out of their all-day drug binges, with their bellies full, thanks to the spoils of a full day's begging. They crowd around the pianos in groups of four or five, and one of them sits down to entertain the rest. And, I'm telling you, these kids are quite good.
I don't mean that they are "good, for being street kids." I mean they are legitimately good. One is an excellent R&B vocalist who sings what seems to be original compositions; love songs, mostly, the stuff of youth and R&B. Another plays what sounds like pop songs, but there is something uniquely "off" about the harmonic content - it doesn't sound bad, it sounds innovative. He taps his foot, and I can't help but notice his badly worn shoes. A great many of them play songs I've never heard before, greatly embellished with impressive improvisations.
All that is to say, they are great musicians. Any of them could draw a crowd, given a paid venue in which to play.
But they are street kids. Their lives consist mostly of begging and doing drugs. They form friendships and they treat each other well. They are nice enough. But they are street kids, without homes, without educations, without jobs, without any ambition. Their lives revolve around dealing, buying, eating at McDonald's, and... playing impressive music on free pianos.
Then the logician in me kicks in. It wonders how the same person who can be moved to learn how to play the piano, and play it well, can fully lack dedication in every other aspect of his or her life. Learning to play the piano well takes literal years of dedication, and normally that kind of dedication is associated with more positive life outcomes than homelessness and drug addiction.
Who are these kids? How did they get here? Where will they end up when they get older? How many of life's paths were altered by their decisions to surrender to life on the street? What will happen to these lives that could have been?
The pianos were clearly some bureaucrat's idea of a downtown beautification project. They are old, upright pianos, brightly colored, positioned just far enough away from each other than the sound coming from one is inaudible to the person playing the next. There are signs urging the public to sit down and play.
In the early evening, during happy hour, there are exactly the kinds of people you might expect: Old, bearded has-beens who play "Piano Man," young hipsters trying to impress their dates with an introductory level knowledge of some recognizable Mozart themes, random people sheepishly poking at the keys to test whether or not the pianos are part of some marketing campaign, surprised that the pianos do, in fact work.
Later on, though, the street kids come out of their all-day drug binges, with their bellies full, thanks to the spoils of a full day's begging. They crowd around the pianos in groups of four or five, and one of them sits down to entertain the rest. And, I'm telling you, these kids are quite good.
I don't mean that they are "good, for being street kids." I mean they are legitimately good. One is an excellent R&B vocalist who sings what seems to be original compositions; love songs, mostly, the stuff of youth and R&B. Another plays what sounds like pop songs, but there is something uniquely "off" about the harmonic content - it doesn't sound bad, it sounds innovative. He taps his foot, and I can't help but notice his badly worn shoes. A great many of them play songs I've never heard before, greatly embellished with impressive improvisations.
All that is to say, they are great musicians. Any of them could draw a crowd, given a paid venue in which to play.
But they are street kids. Their lives consist mostly of begging and doing drugs. They form friendships and they treat each other well. They are nice enough. But they are street kids, without homes, without educations, without jobs, without any ambition. Their lives revolve around dealing, buying, eating at McDonald's, and... playing impressive music on free pianos.
Then the logician in me kicks in. It wonders how the same person who can be moved to learn how to play the piano, and play it well, can fully lack dedication in every other aspect of his or her life. Learning to play the piano well takes literal years of dedication, and normally that kind of dedication is associated with more positive life outcomes than homelessness and drug addiction.
Who are these kids? How did they get here? Where will they end up when they get older? How many of life's paths were altered by their decisions to surrender to life on the street? What will happen to these lives that could have been?
The Gnome Hypothesis
Yesterday, while arguing on the internet, I invented a new concept, which I have added to the Lexicon. I call it The Gnome Hypothesis. The gist of it runs something like this:
Suppose there is a nearby parallel universe inhabited by gnomes. If this is true, then they may live in a castle or a cave. Caves are more common than castles, so caves are the more likely scenario. If they do live in a cave, then they likely use a lot of torches and lanterns. Therefore, I assert that the gnomes who inhabit a parallel universe live in a cave and use a lot of torches and lanterns.
The appeal of the Gnome Hypothesis is that, like a real, scientific hypothesis, there is deductive logic involved. Unlike a real, scientific hypothesis, though, the Gnome Hypothesis is entirely dependent on the acceptance of a series of unknown assumptions.
Thus, I define the Gnome Hypothesis as follows: It is any chain of logic that is valid, but derived from imaginary assumptions. There are two subcategories of the Gnome Hypothesis.
Category "A" Gnome Hypotheses
A true, classic Gnome Hypothesis is one I'll call "Category A." In this version of it, the assumptions underlying the reasoning are pure conjecture in the same sense that a parallel universe inhabited by gnomes is pure conjecture. We have no underlying reason to believe that this is the case. We are simply imagining it.
While this sounds like something I am judging harshly, it need not be. I would suggest that the majority of cutting edge theoretical physics qualifies - initially, anyway - as a Gnome Hypothesis. A physicist will start by assuming a set of conditions that are mostly pure fantasy, and attempt to derive physical knowledge from those assumptions. For example, physicists have done great work by imagining what one would see if one were positioned at the event horizon of a black hole. Einstein himself theorized about what one would see if one were aboard a train travelling at the speed of light. Real, genuine advances in theoretical physics have unfolded this way. So Gnome Hypotheses are not all bad.
There is a crucial aspect of Gnome Hypotheses that are good, though. Physicists, having derived a set of conclusions from their hypotheses, next test these conclusions either in a laboratory, when possible, to determine their truth. If laboratory tests are not possible, as in the case of black holes, etc., then the conclusions are exposed to previously proven theoretical hypotheses to see whether the new ones conform to our existing body of knowledge. In either case, there is a test, and the truth is determined.
Popular Gnome Hypotheses, however, are never tested. Let's look at an example.
When I was a teenager, I used to park one of the family cars in front of the house. One day, though, I happened to park it beside the house rather than in front of it. My mother woke up, looked out her window (which faces the front of the house), and became worried that the car had been stolen. I quickly assured her that I had merely parked it in a different location, and all was right within a few tense minutes.
So, in this case my mother's belief that (a) she cannot see the car; (b) if the car were stolen, she would not be able to see it; (c) therefore, someone stole the car is an example of a Category A Gnome Hypothesis. It is a chain of logic based largely on pure speculation.
Category "B" Gnome Hypotheses
Now, we need to differentiate this case from the case of a person who engages in a valid chain of logic based on a set of assumptions that may or may not be true. That is, the assumptions are open to further investigation, but the logic proceeds with itself anyway.
It is easy to confuse a Category B Gnome Hypothesis with logic constructed for the explicit purpose of testing the validity of the assumptions. But in order to do that, additional assumptions are brought in to be reconciled with the assumptions of interest. For example, Peter might claim that gravity does not exist, and Paul would say, "Let us assume that there is no gravity; and yet, when you jump, you return to Earth. It must be true that some force is pulling you back down to Earth; thus what we observe is consistent with the view that the Law of Gravity exists."
A real Category B Hypothesis involves a claim that is both knowable and unknown. For example, Peter may state, "I believe the man walking over there is an Englishman." Paul would be committing a Category B Gnome Hypothesis if his response to Peter were along the lines of: "Let us assume that the man is an Englishman; if so, then he would speak English. But if I walk up to him and he speaks Russian to me, then he is a very peculiar Englishman indeed! It must be a puzzle, then."
In this case, what Paul says is convincingly probable, since, after all, an Englishman would be more likely to begin a conversation in English than in Russian. But there is no particular reason to venture a hypothesis such as this, since Peter and Paul may as well ask the man whether or not he is an Englishman. Or at least strike up a conversation with him to see whether they can otherwise infer that he is an Englishman.
In other words, instead of collecting data, Paul conjures up a story about what might be the case. Whether the observed man is English is a determinable fact. Paul may feel uncomfortable approaching the man, but in absence of asking him outright, all further conjecture is little more than a thought experiment. Perhaps it is entertaining as conversation, but it does not reveal much truth.
Conclusion
Well, I am sure you will read more from me about the Gnome Hypothesis in the future. For now, I thought I would merely define it, illustrate it briefly, and file it away for future reference.
Suppose there is a nearby parallel universe inhabited by gnomes. If this is true, then they may live in a castle or a cave. Caves are more common than castles, so caves are the more likely scenario. If they do live in a cave, then they likely use a lot of torches and lanterns. Therefore, I assert that the gnomes who inhabit a parallel universe live in a cave and use a lot of torches and lanterns.
The appeal of the Gnome Hypothesis is that, like a real, scientific hypothesis, there is deductive logic involved. Unlike a real, scientific hypothesis, though, the Gnome Hypothesis is entirely dependent on the acceptance of a series of unknown assumptions.
Thus, I define the Gnome Hypothesis as follows: It is any chain of logic that is valid, but derived from imaginary assumptions. There are two subcategories of the Gnome Hypothesis.
Category "A" Gnome Hypotheses
A true, classic Gnome Hypothesis is one I'll call "Category A." In this version of it, the assumptions underlying the reasoning are pure conjecture in the same sense that a parallel universe inhabited by gnomes is pure conjecture. We have no underlying reason to believe that this is the case. We are simply imagining it.
While this sounds like something I am judging harshly, it need not be. I would suggest that the majority of cutting edge theoretical physics qualifies - initially, anyway - as a Gnome Hypothesis. A physicist will start by assuming a set of conditions that are mostly pure fantasy, and attempt to derive physical knowledge from those assumptions. For example, physicists have done great work by imagining what one would see if one were positioned at the event horizon of a black hole. Einstein himself theorized about what one would see if one were aboard a train travelling at the speed of light. Real, genuine advances in theoretical physics have unfolded this way. So Gnome Hypotheses are not all bad.
There is a crucial aspect of Gnome Hypotheses that are good, though. Physicists, having derived a set of conclusions from their hypotheses, next test these conclusions either in a laboratory, when possible, to determine their truth. If laboratory tests are not possible, as in the case of black holes, etc., then the conclusions are exposed to previously proven theoretical hypotheses to see whether the new ones conform to our existing body of knowledge. In either case, there is a test, and the truth is determined.
Popular Gnome Hypotheses, however, are never tested. Let's look at an example.
When I was a teenager, I used to park one of the family cars in front of the house. One day, though, I happened to park it beside the house rather than in front of it. My mother woke up, looked out her window (which faces the front of the house), and became worried that the car had been stolen. I quickly assured her that I had merely parked it in a different location, and all was right within a few tense minutes.
So, in this case my mother's belief that (a) she cannot see the car; (b) if the car were stolen, she would not be able to see it; (c) therefore, someone stole the car is an example of a Category A Gnome Hypothesis. It is a chain of logic based largely on pure speculation.
Category "B" Gnome Hypotheses
Now, we need to differentiate this case from the case of a person who engages in a valid chain of logic based on a set of assumptions that may or may not be true. That is, the assumptions are open to further investigation, but the logic proceeds with itself anyway.
It is easy to confuse a Category B Gnome Hypothesis with logic constructed for the explicit purpose of testing the validity of the assumptions. But in order to do that, additional assumptions are brought in to be reconciled with the assumptions of interest. For example, Peter might claim that gravity does not exist, and Paul would say, "Let us assume that there is no gravity; and yet, when you jump, you return to Earth. It must be true that some force is pulling you back down to Earth; thus what we observe is consistent with the view that the Law of Gravity exists."
A real Category B Hypothesis involves a claim that is both knowable and unknown. For example, Peter may state, "I believe the man walking over there is an Englishman." Paul would be committing a Category B Gnome Hypothesis if his response to Peter were along the lines of: "Let us assume that the man is an Englishman; if so, then he would speak English. But if I walk up to him and he speaks Russian to me, then he is a very peculiar Englishman indeed! It must be a puzzle, then."
In this case, what Paul says is convincingly probable, since, after all, an Englishman would be more likely to begin a conversation in English than in Russian. But there is no particular reason to venture a hypothesis such as this, since Peter and Paul may as well ask the man whether or not he is an Englishman. Or at least strike up a conversation with him to see whether they can otherwise infer that he is an Englishman.
In other words, instead of collecting data, Paul conjures up a story about what might be the case. Whether the observed man is English is a determinable fact. Paul may feel uncomfortable approaching the man, but in absence of asking him outright, all further conjecture is little more than a thought experiment. Perhaps it is entertaining as conversation, but it does not reveal much truth.
Conclusion
Well, I am sure you will read more from me about the Gnome Hypothesis in the future. For now, I thought I would merely define it, illustrate it briefly, and file it away for future reference.
Fuzzy Logic Produces Fuzzy Thoughts
Good reasoning is clear, concise, and consistent. Mediocre reasoning wants for clarity, brevity, consistence, or some combination thereof. Poor reasoning wants for all three.
Having a clear, concise, and consistent point of view is important because, in its absence, all you really have is a poorly reasoned justification for feeling a particular way. The only difference between this and the way a child feels is the quantity of words used to explain it.
The difference between a philosopher and an average joe is the fact that the philosopher actually takes his reasoning seriously. At a certain point, we must all start to take our own thoughts seriously, or content ourselves with essential vapidity.
Paradoxes Are Shallow
You may have heard the old question, "Is god so powerful that he can create a boulder so heavy that he himself cannot lift it?" It seems like a ridiculous question, but at the heart of it is the notion of what it means to be omnipotent. The question is really more about omnipotence than it is about god. If god has limits either in terms of what he can create or what he can lift, then (by definition) he is not omnipotent.
Really, that question is a logical paradox. The confusion comes from conceptual ambiguity. Being omnipotent means being capable of anything. The paradox arises when you define any act to be impossible. It might be the creation of a stone too heavy to lift, or it might be a pancake too large too eat, or it might be a universe too vast to be understood. At any rate, the rhetorical trick employed here amounts to the same thing: Is god powerful enough to do that which is by definition impossible. As I have written before, paradoxes always come down to either linguistic ambiguity or outright contradiction.
But if you are simply unaware of the fact that a paradox is really just a contradiction in terms, then you will find yourself doing as Aristotle wrote: "Men wish to prove paradoxes that they me be counted clever[.]" That is to say, there are a great many entertaining blog posts to be written about apparent contradictions, which are little more than contradictions in terms. An omnipotent god that cannot lift a stone is exactly as meaningful as a pair of gloves that are meant to be worn by a man with no arms. There is no profundity to be had. It is a bad parlor trick, consisting only of providing a definition that contradicts itself and then decorating it with invalid logic that merely appears valid to those inattentive enough to identify the contradiction.
Shotgun Theories Are Shallow
I have written before about shotgun theories. This is another shallow parlor trick. The way it works is that one posits a theory with sufficient ambiguity to feel truthful at first glance. Upon greater scrutiny, however, the statement is revealed to be false.
A common shotgun theory I can cite for example is Kahlil Gibran's famous quote: "It is when you give of yourself that you truly give." Superficially, everyone is ready to agree with this statement immediately. But upon close scrutiny, how is one to know when one is giving "of oneself"? The phrase is too ambiguous to take seriously.
Similarly, the coward "John Doe" offers a shotgun theory against immigration: immigrants who do not pay taxes are like roommates who do not pay the rent. There are many problems with this hypothesis, but the main one is that if John Doe pays his takes while Pablo Inmigrante does not, only Pablo faces extradition; John will be just fine. Whereas, when I pay my share of the rent and my roommate does not pay his share, we both get evicted. Of course, this is only one of many ways in which immigration is nothing like being someone's roommate. I tried to make this point to John Doe, but he would rather cling to his shotgun theory than take his own propositions seriously enough that he subject them to heavy scrutiny. Of course, I would expect nothing less of a man who cannot even sign his own name to his own opinions. One can only expect so much of a person who is reluctant to go public with his own beliefs.
Rhetorical questions are a subtler form of shotgun theory. Rather than saying "It is when you give of yourself that you truly give," I can express the same sentiment in the form of a question. "Isn't it truly giving when you give of yourself?" The expression is slightly different, but the sentiment is the same.
Thus, if John Doe is spouting shotgun theories by declaring that immigrants are roommates who don't pay the rent, then Sonic Charmer's spin on this same notion is to ask rhetorically (although he won't admit that it's a rhetorical question because he wants to argue about it), "How can this be? Why would it be? [...] Do you believe it?" Sure, it's an invitation to answer his questions, but his opinion is firmly couched in his positing the questions in the first place.
Of course, the answer to Sonic Charmer's questions are obvious. On the one hand, we can merely look to the facts to determine whether illegal immigrants cost more than they contribute. For all his criticism of CBO numbers, he has not produced a single speck of evidence for the notion that illegal immigrants cost us all money. Instead, he asks rhetorical questions.
But on the other hand, the answer might simply be that illegal immigrants are more interested in an honest day's work than in receiving social services. That would make them more or less the same as any member of the "working poor." This explanation is so obvious that the mind fairly reels as to why Sonic Charmer didn't consider it himself. Really, this is not a rhetorical question: Why didn't Sonic Charmer think of this explanation himself? I do not not want to believe that it is racism, but what are the other possibilities?
At any rate, whether we are talking about shotgun theories expressed through rhetorical questions or by actual declarations, the result is the same: Things sound much more appealing when they are vague. It's difficult to prove a logical proposition with real intellectual rigor, but the alternative is laziness. That simply won't do.
Conclusion
Well, it is simply very difficult to prove a logical proposition conclusively. In the field of philosophy, very few people managed to prove any important ideas between the time of Aristotle and the time of Foucault. The few who did were nothing short of geniuses. Logic requires a rigor that few can live up to. I myself might be incapable of it. To suggest that some people have fallen far short is not to suggest that I myself am capable of more.
But philosophy is a pursuit of truth, and falsehood cannot be tolerated, even among those who are not completely capable of proving the truth conclusively themselves. Similarly, we are all required to adhere to Newton's Laws regardless of whether or not we can prove them. Believing only what is true is a much lower standard than proving a totally new truth.
We do not sidestep this issue by ignoring the rigor demanded of us when we stake a bold position. Although it is easier to ignore the difficult steps in the process, it does not get us off the hook. We cannot simply proffer contradictory definitions, shotgun theories, or rhetorical questions as a substitute for intellectual rigor. It might feel good to blow off some steam, but it doesn't put you on the right side of an issue.
In short, fuzzy logic produces fuzzy thoughts. When people call those thoughts into question, they are doing so because those thoughts are fuzzy, not because they are irksome people. At the end of the day, truth is more important than expedience.
Having a clear, concise, and consistent point of view is important because, in its absence, all you really have is a poorly reasoned justification for feeling a particular way. The only difference between this and the way a child feels is the quantity of words used to explain it.
The difference between a philosopher and an average joe is the fact that the philosopher actually takes his reasoning seriously. At a certain point, we must all start to take our own thoughts seriously, or content ourselves with essential vapidity.
Paradoxes Are Shallow
You may have heard the old question, "Is god so powerful that he can create a boulder so heavy that he himself cannot lift it?" It seems like a ridiculous question, but at the heart of it is the notion of what it means to be omnipotent. The question is really more about omnipotence than it is about god. If god has limits either in terms of what he can create or what he can lift, then (by definition) he is not omnipotent.
Really, that question is a logical paradox. The confusion comes from conceptual ambiguity. Being omnipotent means being capable of anything. The paradox arises when you define any act to be impossible. It might be the creation of a stone too heavy to lift, or it might be a pancake too large too eat, or it might be a universe too vast to be understood. At any rate, the rhetorical trick employed here amounts to the same thing: Is god powerful enough to do that which is by definition impossible. As I have written before, paradoxes always come down to either linguistic ambiguity or outright contradiction.
But if you are simply unaware of the fact that a paradox is really just a contradiction in terms, then you will find yourself doing as Aristotle wrote: "Men wish to prove paradoxes that they me be counted clever[.]" That is to say, there are a great many entertaining blog posts to be written about apparent contradictions, which are little more than contradictions in terms. An omnipotent god that cannot lift a stone is exactly as meaningful as a pair of gloves that are meant to be worn by a man with no arms. There is no profundity to be had. It is a bad parlor trick, consisting only of providing a definition that contradicts itself and then decorating it with invalid logic that merely appears valid to those inattentive enough to identify the contradiction.
Shotgun Theories Are Shallow
I have written before about shotgun theories. This is another shallow parlor trick. The way it works is that one posits a theory with sufficient ambiguity to feel truthful at first glance. Upon greater scrutiny, however, the statement is revealed to be false.
A common shotgun theory I can cite for example is Kahlil Gibran's famous quote: "It is when you give of yourself that you truly give." Superficially, everyone is ready to agree with this statement immediately. But upon close scrutiny, how is one to know when one is giving "of oneself"? The phrase is too ambiguous to take seriously.
Similarly, the coward "John Doe" offers a shotgun theory against immigration: immigrants who do not pay taxes are like roommates who do not pay the rent. There are many problems with this hypothesis, but the main one is that if John Doe pays his takes while Pablo Inmigrante does not, only Pablo faces extradition; John will be just fine. Whereas, when I pay my share of the rent and my roommate does not pay his share, we both get evicted. Of course, this is only one of many ways in which immigration is nothing like being someone's roommate. I tried to make this point to John Doe, but he would rather cling to his shotgun theory than take his own propositions seriously enough that he subject them to heavy scrutiny. Of course, I would expect nothing less of a man who cannot even sign his own name to his own opinions. One can only expect so much of a person who is reluctant to go public with his own beliefs.
Rhetorical questions are a subtler form of shotgun theory. Rather than saying "It is when you give of yourself that you truly give," I can express the same sentiment in the form of a question. "Isn't it truly giving when you give of yourself?" The expression is slightly different, but the sentiment is the same.
Thus, if John Doe is spouting shotgun theories by declaring that immigrants are roommates who don't pay the rent, then Sonic Charmer's spin on this same notion is to ask rhetorically (although he won't admit that it's a rhetorical question because he wants to argue about it), "How can this be? Why would it be? [...] Do you believe it?" Sure, it's an invitation to answer his questions, but his opinion is firmly couched in his positing the questions in the first place.
Of course, the answer to Sonic Charmer's questions are obvious. On the one hand, we can merely look to the facts to determine whether illegal immigrants cost more than they contribute. For all his criticism of CBO numbers, he has not produced a single speck of evidence for the notion that illegal immigrants cost us all money. Instead, he asks rhetorical questions.
But on the other hand, the answer might simply be that illegal immigrants are more interested in an honest day's work than in receiving social services. That would make them more or less the same as any member of the "working poor." This explanation is so obvious that the mind fairly reels as to why Sonic Charmer didn't consider it himself. Really, this is not a rhetorical question: Why didn't Sonic Charmer think of this explanation himself? I do not not want to believe that it is racism, but what are the other possibilities?
At any rate, whether we are talking about shotgun theories expressed through rhetorical questions or by actual declarations, the result is the same: Things sound much more appealing when they are vague. It's difficult to prove a logical proposition with real intellectual rigor, but the alternative is laziness. That simply won't do.
Conclusion
Well, it is simply very difficult to prove a logical proposition conclusively. In the field of philosophy, very few people managed to prove any important ideas between the time of Aristotle and the time of Foucault. The few who did were nothing short of geniuses. Logic requires a rigor that few can live up to. I myself might be incapable of it. To suggest that some people have fallen far short is not to suggest that I myself am capable of more.
But philosophy is a pursuit of truth, and falsehood cannot be tolerated, even among those who are not completely capable of proving the truth conclusively themselves. Similarly, we are all required to adhere to Newton's Laws regardless of whether or not we can prove them. Believing only what is true is a much lower standard than proving a totally new truth.
We do not sidestep this issue by ignoring the rigor demanded of us when we stake a bold position. Although it is easier to ignore the difficult steps in the process, it does not get us off the hook. We cannot simply proffer contradictory definitions, shotgun theories, or rhetorical questions as a substitute for intellectual rigor. It might feel good to blow off some steam, but it doesn't put you on the right side of an issue.
In short, fuzzy logic produces fuzzy thoughts. When people call those thoughts into question, they are doing so because those thoughts are fuzzy, not because they are irksome people. At the end of the day, truth is more important than expedience.
2013-06-24
The Acoustic Scale
I haven't found very much information about this beautiful scale, so I thought I would take some time to blog about it, share what little I have discovered, and discuss some applications as far as I've been able to discover them.
What Is The Acoustic Scale?
I discovered the Acoustic Scale quite by accident. I was trying to write a riff for a new song. I tried to play a melody that I first thought was in Lydian Mode (when I was hearing it in my head), but the problem was one of the notes was wrong. So I moved that note down a half-step, figuring that I was just playing Lydian Mode incorrectly. Bingo - there was my melody, and it sounded great.
...Except when I wrote down the notes, I realized that the "wrong" note that now sounded "right" was outside of Lydian Mode. What I had on my hands was a melody that featured a sharp 4th (the defining feature of Lydian Mode), but it also had a flat 7th (the defining feature of Mixolydian Mode). But I knew of no mode that contained both.
A search for common scales revealed that my melody was utilizing something called "The Acoustic Scale," which I had never heard of until yesterday. This scale is also known as "Lydian Dominant" (#4 = Lydian, b7 = Dominant), and "the Bartok Scale."
What It Sounds Like
You don't really get a good sense of this scale by playing it through. It has a subtle charm to it (initially). Because it is basically a half-Lydian and half-Mixolydian cross-breed, I think the human brain has a tendency to interpret the first half of the scale as being typical Lydian, and the second half as typical Mixolydian. I think this happens psychoacoustically, so quickly that it becomes difficult to become aware of the Acoustic Scale as its own distinct tonality.
One starts to understand it when one starts to build harmonic content atop it, rather than simply expressing it modally. For a good sense of what this sounds like, start by listening to the man who first mastered it:
Once you've digested the appetizer, try the main course.
Discussion And Application
The Acoustic Scale has a really pleasant sound to it that begs for exploration. The challenge is figuring out how to build beautiful harmonic content from it. Jazz gets away with it because it only ever uses it as a passing thing. Bartok got away with it because he was specifically defying convention.
Perhaps the core challenge to utilizing the Acoustic Scale pertains to what I said in the previous section. It seems as though the brain wants to split the scale into two. We are so familiar with Lydian and Mixolydian phrases that, for any Lydian Dominant melody, the brain freaks out a little bit. If you can keep your mind on task, though, you can learn to appreciate its inherent charms.
There are some really interesting turns of phrase you can employ. My ear automatically gravitated to the v --> v/sus2 --> II transition. This sounds a little bit like IV-iv-I with a twist. A newcomer to the mode will want to gravitate toward the v and the vi along with the I and the II, but the problem with that is that you run into a problem of variety. You can come up with a good melody that spans the I and the II; you can come up with a good melody that spans the v and the vi... but when you put all 4 chords together, there only seem to be a few that "work."
The VII+ is a nice addition, but in the context of guitar music, the tendency to play it as a 1/5+ interval screws with the tonality of the overall composition.
But, in a rock context at least, it's common to waver back and forth between two key signatures. If you lean heavily on the harmonic minor scale of the v then you get some interesting changes. Lean on it too much, and you get sucked into that tonality, but throwing in the occasional G major when you're playing in E makes for some good times.
Conclusion
I have yet to finish the job of exploring this mode, but I already love the breath of fresh air it brings to the composition process. I highly recommend exploring this beautiful scale and finding your own approach to it. I hope to revisit this topic again soon, with an audio example of my own.
What Is The Acoustic Scale?
I discovered the Acoustic Scale quite by accident. I was trying to write a riff for a new song. I tried to play a melody that I first thought was in Lydian Mode (when I was hearing it in my head), but the problem was one of the notes was wrong. So I moved that note down a half-step, figuring that I was just playing Lydian Mode incorrectly. Bingo - there was my melody, and it sounded great.
...Except when I wrote down the notes, I realized that the "wrong" note that now sounded "right" was outside of Lydian Mode. What I had on my hands was a melody that featured a sharp 4th (the defining feature of Lydian Mode), but it also had a flat 7th (the defining feature of Mixolydian Mode). But I knew of no mode that contained both.
A search for common scales revealed that my melody was utilizing something called "The Acoustic Scale," which I had never heard of until yesterday. This scale is also known as "Lydian Dominant" (#4 = Lydian, b7 = Dominant), and "the Bartok Scale."
What It Sounds Like
You don't really get a good sense of this scale by playing it through. It has a subtle charm to it (initially). Because it is basically a half-Lydian and half-Mixolydian cross-breed, I think the human brain has a tendency to interpret the first half of the scale as being typical Lydian, and the second half as typical Mixolydian. I think this happens psychoacoustically, so quickly that it becomes difficult to become aware of the Acoustic Scale as its own distinct tonality.
One starts to understand it when one starts to build harmonic content atop it, rather than simply expressing it modally. For a good sense of what this sounds like, start by listening to the man who first mastered it:
Once you've digested the appetizer, try the main course.
Discussion And Application
The Acoustic Scale has a really pleasant sound to it that begs for exploration. The challenge is figuring out how to build beautiful harmonic content from it. Jazz gets away with it because it only ever uses it as a passing thing. Bartok got away with it because he was specifically defying convention.
Perhaps the core challenge to utilizing the Acoustic Scale pertains to what I said in the previous section. It seems as though the brain wants to split the scale into two. We are so familiar with Lydian and Mixolydian phrases that, for any Lydian Dominant melody, the brain freaks out a little bit. If you can keep your mind on task, though, you can learn to appreciate its inherent charms.
There are some really interesting turns of phrase you can employ. My ear automatically gravitated to the v --> v/sus2 --> II transition. This sounds a little bit like IV-iv-I with a twist. A newcomer to the mode will want to gravitate toward the v and the vi along with the I and the II, but the problem with that is that you run into a problem of variety. You can come up with a good melody that spans the I and the II; you can come up with a good melody that spans the v and the vi... but when you put all 4 chords together, there only seem to be a few that "work."
The VII+ is a nice addition, but in the context of guitar music, the tendency to play it as a 1/5+ interval screws with the tonality of the overall composition.
But, in a rock context at least, it's common to waver back and forth between two key signatures. If you lean heavily on the harmonic minor scale of the v then you get some interesting changes. Lean on it too much, and you get sucked into that tonality, but throwing in the occasional G major when you're playing in E makes for some good times.
Conclusion
I have yet to finish the job of exploring this mode, but I already love the breath of fresh air it brings to the composition process. I highly recommend exploring this beautiful scale and finding your own approach to it. I hope to revisit this topic again soon, with an audio example of my own.
2013-06-21
Stationary Waves And Immigration
This morning Bryan Caplan links to a thirteen-year-old article by Marginal Revolution's Alex Tabarrok that briefly justifies open immigration policy using various systems of normative ethics. Caplan is correct; the Tabarrok article is excellent.
The article is of particular interest to Stationary Waves readers because, not only has poor Sonic Charmer been haplessly railing against open borders lately (here, here, and here), but also because I have been thinking about - and writing about - normative ethics a lot this week. The strength of Tabarrok's article is that he assesses the merits of immigration according to nearly ever kind of objection that could raised, at least every objection that is rooted in a formal theory of normative ethics. Those who object, then, face the responsibility of explaining why immigration is not ethical, in the language of normative ethics. It is a powerful rhetorical tool, and I doubt Sonic Charmer and those who share his opinions would ever undertake the task. (Lending credence to this is the fact that Sonic Charmer's written response this morning favors snark over substance.)
But, rather than discuss Tabarrok's points, I thought I would give immigration the Stationary Waves treatment.
Immigration And The Collectivist-Individualist Divide
One way of viewing the immigration issue is as a conflict between individualism and collectivism.
The immigrant, by the very act of leaving his community at home for a chance at a better life, is engaged in an individualist - and therefore existential - pursuit. The community he joins, however, consists of people having two different attitudes.
Those who welcome the immigrant primarily do so for moral reasons, in that they feel it would be unjust to make him suffer simply because came from another place. Even if they don't find moral arguments for immigration compelling, they nonetheless feel that treating someone poorly is immoral if their only real justification is xenophobia.
Those who reject the immigrant primarily do so for existential reasons. Properly understood, their arguments are not about whether or not open immigration policy is "moral." Instead, their concern is how an influx of immigrants will affect their lives. Their strongest objection is wholly existential: What, they ask, is the meaning of a border, if that border is not enforced? Weaker objections are no less existential: What will become of the nation's welfare policies? What will happen to rates of crime and disease? Finally, there is the nuanced existential question of how groups are defined. Many anti-immigrationists suggest that allowing foreigners into the local community significantly alters the constitution of that community. While this appears to be a social concern, it is actually existential because it speaks to the definition of the community, as well as their own individual relationship to it. That is to say, it involves their perception of how they themselves exist in relation to the community, as opposed to how they and the community interact together.
All that is to say that the immigrant's existential motives create existential conflict among some, and moral harmony among others. This is consistent with what I wrote before, when I stated that "where there is existential conflict, there is moral hope."
Thus, using the collectivist-individualist analytical framework, the only way the immigration conflict can actually be resolved is through morality. You might not enjoy the fact that your home value has decreased thanks to immigration (oh, brother...), but how ethical is it to prevent certain ethnic groups from moving in next door?
Well, Tabarrok undertook this question from a variety of moral directions and reached the same conclusion with all of them. Sonic Charmer may snark, but can he offer a moral justification for closed borders?
Immigration And The Rules-Merit Schema
Next we move on to the rules vs. merit schema I introduced earlier this month.
Every argument in favor of immigration is an appeal to the merits of the enterprise. Immigrants bring with them labor skills that are either not present in our country, or not present in equal supply. An increase in the supply of anything of value is a net gain; and this is not just true ceteris parabus, but in each and every case. More of a good is better by definition. The only time that isn't the case is when we are prevented by law from employing our new-found surplus (by anti-immigration and minimum wage laws, for example).
Rhetoric against open immigration are frequently appeals to the "merit" of keeping the borders closed. The reasons such arguments must appeal to merit is because the merits of immigration are pervasive and overwhelming. In order to defeat the case for immigration, opponents must convince us that the demerits of an influx of immigrants outweigh the merits. So, they will argue that immigrants adversely impact that social order, drive down wages, increase unemployment and national debt, cause us to have to learn new languages and smell foreign foods. And, incredibly, they even say that immigration undermines democracy through the importation of anti-democratic sentiment.
The alternative to the merit-based policy is the rule-based policy, which is what we have today. There are rules defining who can come into the country to seek work. There are rules defining which countries the immigrants can come from. There are rules about what skills they must possess, how much money they must possess, and how many medical examinations they must pass. Every aspect of anti-immigration sentiment is codified in laws, in rules that act as barriers to a merit-based system settling the question by a proper weighing of all risks.
Currently, the question is set by the rules, and the rules are drafted by those who oppose immigration. However, if we were allowed to settle the question on a comparison of merits, then we would once and for all see whether the merits offered by the pro-immigration crowd outweigh the demerits offered by immigration's opponents.
Except that we do not actually have to wait for that day, because the evidence is already clear. Despite the heaping of additional costs on immigrants through the above-mentioned rules, they continue to come to America. Despite the many demerits cited against immigration, we continue to welcome immigrants into our communities. We buy their food, shop in their stores, hire them for labor both skilled and unskilled. Gauged by our economic actions, we spend every single day reaping the benefits of immigration. Judging from our actions, the merits outweigh the demerits. Immigration is net positive. We are all better off.
This leads to my final framework for analyzing the issue.
Immigration And Actions Versus Feelings
Also earlier this month, I wrote about how it is our actions, not our feelings, that determines our worth. This is related to the points I made in the previous section because, if we are going to talk about settling an issue on the merits of each position, we need to determine how we will assess merit.
Economics is a handy way to do this, because whenever you value something, you prove that you are willing to pay for it, even if you complain about the price you pay. When you no longer value something enough, you stop complaining because you stop paying for it. The jargon term for this is "revealed preference." To wit, what does it matter whether Sonic Charmer or anyone else complains about immigration if all opponents of immigration continue to make economic decisions consistent with the fact that they are economically better off when there are more immigrants around? They might say they dislike immigration, but their purchases suggest otherwise.
Expanding the lens a little bit, it is significant enough that the black market for illegal immigrant labor is sizable. The American community at large welcomes immigrants even despite the laws it has passed to try to fight their own preferences. Anti-immigration laws and immigration regulations are all just rules designed to fight the revealed preferences of Americans. We know we are better off, at least economically, when borders are relatively open. We know this so well that we have to threaten each other with jail time if one of us decides to act on it. Silly, right?
Well, the economic merits of immigration are overwhelming, and all of us act in reflection of that fact every day of our lives. It does not even matter how we think we feel about it. What matters only is our actions.
Immigration opponents could suggest at this point that there is more to the issue than economics. They would raise social, political, and cultural concerns against immigration and insist that these factors must also be considered with respect to immigration.
Fine, but then why does society act in opposition to those concerns at the end of the day?
Thus, our actions reflect an embrace of pro-immigration sentiment and a rejection of anti-immigration sentiment. All the rest is commentary.
Conclusion
Inspired by Alex Tabarrok, I thought it would fun to employ some recurring Stationary Waves concepts to defend immigration. What I have said above is certainly not an exhaustive treatment of the issue. In fact, what I've just written doesn't even come close to expressing every reason I am in favor of open immigration. Mostly, it was an exercise in applying my philosophical concepts to a particular issue.
It is encouraging to note that these concepts can be applied consistently.
The article is of particular interest to Stationary Waves readers because, not only has poor Sonic Charmer been haplessly railing against open borders lately (here, here, and here), but also because I have been thinking about - and writing about - normative ethics a lot this week. The strength of Tabarrok's article is that he assesses the merits of immigration according to nearly ever kind of objection that could raised, at least every objection that is rooted in a formal theory of normative ethics. Those who object, then, face the responsibility of explaining why immigration is not ethical, in the language of normative ethics. It is a powerful rhetorical tool, and I doubt Sonic Charmer and those who share his opinions would ever undertake the task. (Lending credence to this is the fact that Sonic Charmer's written response this morning favors snark over substance.)
But, rather than discuss Tabarrok's points, I thought I would give immigration the Stationary Waves treatment.
Immigration And The Collectivist-Individualist Divide
One way of viewing the immigration issue is as a conflict between individualism and collectivism.
The immigrant, by the very act of leaving his community at home for a chance at a better life, is engaged in an individualist - and therefore existential - pursuit. The community he joins, however, consists of people having two different attitudes.
Those who welcome the immigrant primarily do so for moral reasons, in that they feel it would be unjust to make him suffer simply because came from another place. Even if they don't find moral arguments for immigration compelling, they nonetheless feel that treating someone poorly is immoral if their only real justification is xenophobia.
Those who reject the immigrant primarily do so for existential reasons. Properly understood, their arguments are not about whether or not open immigration policy is "moral." Instead, their concern is how an influx of immigrants will affect their lives. Their strongest objection is wholly existential: What, they ask, is the meaning of a border, if that border is not enforced? Weaker objections are no less existential: What will become of the nation's welfare policies? What will happen to rates of crime and disease? Finally, there is the nuanced existential question of how groups are defined. Many anti-immigrationists suggest that allowing foreigners into the local community significantly alters the constitution of that community. While this appears to be a social concern, it is actually existential because it speaks to the definition of the community, as well as their own individual relationship to it. That is to say, it involves their perception of how they themselves exist in relation to the community, as opposed to how they and the community interact together.
All that is to say that the immigrant's existential motives create existential conflict among some, and moral harmony among others. This is consistent with what I wrote before, when I stated that "where there is existential conflict, there is moral hope."
Thus, using the collectivist-individualist analytical framework, the only way the immigration conflict can actually be resolved is through morality. You might not enjoy the fact that your home value has decreased thanks to immigration (oh, brother...), but how ethical is it to prevent certain ethnic groups from moving in next door?
Well, Tabarrok undertook this question from a variety of moral directions and reached the same conclusion with all of them. Sonic Charmer may snark, but can he offer a moral justification for closed borders?
Immigration And The Rules-Merit Schema
Next we move on to the rules vs. merit schema I introduced earlier this month.
Every argument in favor of immigration is an appeal to the merits of the enterprise. Immigrants bring with them labor skills that are either not present in our country, or not present in equal supply. An increase in the supply of anything of value is a net gain; and this is not just true ceteris parabus, but in each and every case. More of a good is better by definition. The only time that isn't the case is when we are prevented by law from employing our new-found surplus (by anti-immigration and minimum wage laws, for example).
Rhetoric against open immigration are frequently appeals to the "merit" of keeping the borders closed. The reasons such arguments must appeal to merit is because the merits of immigration are pervasive and overwhelming. In order to defeat the case for immigration, opponents must convince us that the demerits of an influx of immigrants outweigh the merits. So, they will argue that immigrants adversely impact that social order, drive down wages, increase unemployment and national debt, cause us to have to learn new languages and smell foreign foods. And, incredibly, they even say that immigration undermines democracy through the importation of anti-democratic sentiment.
The alternative to the merit-based policy is the rule-based policy, which is what we have today. There are rules defining who can come into the country to seek work. There are rules defining which countries the immigrants can come from. There are rules about what skills they must possess, how much money they must possess, and how many medical examinations they must pass. Every aspect of anti-immigration sentiment is codified in laws, in rules that act as barriers to a merit-based system settling the question by a proper weighing of all risks.
Currently, the question is set by the rules, and the rules are drafted by those who oppose immigration. However, if we were allowed to settle the question on a comparison of merits, then we would once and for all see whether the merits offered by the pro-immigration crowd outweigh the demerits offered by immigration's opponents.
Except that we do not actually have to wait for that day, because the evidence is already clear. Despite the heaping of additional costs on immigrants through the above-mentioned rules, they continue to come to America. Despite the many demerits cited against immigration, we continue to welcome immigrants into our communities. We buy their food, shop in their stores, hire them for labor both skilled and unskilled. Gauged by our economic actions, we spend every single day reaping the benefits of immigration. Judging from our actions, the merits outweigh the demerits. Immigration is net positive. We are all better off.
This leads to my final framework for analyzing the issue.
Immigration And Actions Versus Feelings
Also earlier this month, I wrote about how it is our actions, not our feelings, that determines our worth. This is related to the points I made in the previous section because, if we are going to talk about settling an issue on the merits of each position, we need to determine how we will assess merit.
Economics is a handy way to do this, because whenever you value something, you prove that you are willing to pay for it, even if you complain about the price you pay. When you no longer value something enough, you stop complaining because you stop paying for it. The jargon term for this is "revealed preference." To wit, what does it matter whether Sonic Charmer or anyone else complains about immigration if all opponents of immigration continue to make economic decisions consistent with the fact that they are economically better off when there are more immigrants around? They might say they dislike immigration, but their purchases suggest otherwise.
Expanding the lens a little bit, it is significant enough that the black market for illegal immigrant labor is sizable. The American community at large welcomes immigrants even despite the laws it has passed to try to fight their own preferences. Anti-immigration laws and immigration regulations are all just rules designed to fight the revealed preferences of Americans. We know we are better off, at least economically, when borders are relatively open. We know this so well that we have to threaten each other with jail time if one of us decides to act on it. Silly, right?
Well, the economic merits of immigration are overwhelming, and all of us act in reflection of that fact every day of our lives. It does not even matter how we think we feel about it. What matters only is our actions.
Immigration opponents could suggest at this point that there is more to the issue than economics. They would raise social, political, and cultural concerns against immigration and insist that these factors must also be considered with respect to immigration.
Fine, but then why does society act in opposition to those concerns at the end of the day?
Thus, our actions reflect an embrace of pro-immigration sentiment and a rejection of anti-immigration sentiment. All the rest is commentary.
Conclusion
Inspired by Alex Tabarrok, I thought it would fun to employ some recurring Stationary Waves concepts to defend immigration. What I have said above is certainly not an exhaustive treatment of the issue. In fact, what I've just written doesn't even come close to expressing every reason I am in favor of open immigration. Mostly, it was an exercise in applying my philosophical concepts to a particular issue.
It is encouraging to note that these concepts can be applied consistently.
2013-06-20
Another Business Idea
I have been working out regularly for nearly a quarter-century now. I started young, quickly became familiar with the local coaches and fitness experts, and I've been driving myself hard ever since. Let there be no doubt about it: It feels great.
Not once, however, have I ever felt like the person in this and similar pictures:
Okay, so I'm also not female, but that's not really the point. When you look at pictures like this, you suddenly have the impression that fit people experience this zen sensation of being able to demand anything physical from their bodies and, with concentration, deliver.
Come to think of it, it's a lot like old kung fu movies, in which we see the protagonist preparing to punch through a brick wall or something. He pauses to collect his chi, inhales deeply, and for a moment reaches a level of mental zen that mere brown-belts can only dream of. Then, at the zenith of his mental bliss, he powerfully drives his fist through any obstacle in its path.
Like I say, I've never felt anything like that before, not even close. The truth is, no one feels like this, not even Olympic athletes. It's just a picture.
But what a picture! The person in this picture - or any such picture - is just like that kung fu master punching through a brick wall, or a Buddhist monk achieving Nirvana, combined with a prize fighter whose personal Nirvana is some kind of medicine ball push-up. Wouldn't it be great if we could all feel that way?
So that's my business idea: Combine a well-equipped elite gym with personal training and... personal photography. As an added membership service, photographers would work with the gym's clients and develop a series of social media photos like the above, fit for use as profile photos, cover photos, photo albums, mobile uploads, or however else you may wish to express your fitness zen!
Not once, however, have I ever felt like the person in this and similar pictures:
 |
| Photo courtesy my Google+ feed |
Come to think of it, it's a lot like old kung fu movies, in which we see the protagonist preparing to punch through a brick wall or something. He pauses to collect his chi, inhales deeply, and for a moment reaches a level of mental zen that mere brown-belts can only dream of. Then, at the zenith of his mental bliss, he powerfully drives his fist through any obstacle in its path.
Like I say, I've never felt anything like that before, not even close. The truth is, no one feels like this, not even Olympic athletes. It's just a picture.
But what a picture! The person in this picture - or any such picture - is just like that kung fu master punching through a brick wall, or a Buddhist monk achieving Nirvana, combined with a prize fighter whose personal Nirvana is some kind of medicine ball push-up. Wouldn't it be great if we could all feel that way?
So that's my business idea: Combine a well-equipped elite gym with personal training and... personal photography. As an added membership service, photographers would work with the gym's clients and develop a series of social media photos like the above, fit for use as profile photos, cover photos, photo albums, mobile uploads, or however else you may wish to express your fitness zen!
2013-06-19
Inconsistent Morality Is Immorality
At Marginal Revolution, Tyler Cowen writes:
The Main Ethical Systems
There are three main categories of "normative ethics," as follows:
A few days ago, I used the example of lying in an application of virtue ethics. More concisely, we can look at it as follows:
Complicating And Criss-Crossing
The greater scrutiny we apply to normative ethical theories, the more the lines between them blur. Let me illustrate this by again using lying as our ethical example.
If a person's moral character is to be analyzed in applications of virtue ethics, then motives matter. If the person being analyzed subscribes to deontology or consequentialism, then - according to virtue ethics - his or her motives are virtuous.
Suppose Cary Consequentialist lies in order to take the blame for a conspiracy committed by his five closest family members. His decision to lie and accept responsibility for a crime he didn't commit is fully consistent with utilitarianism: His family members are spared punishment, while justice is served for society at large. No one suffers except Cary, who does so in order to maximize utility. But note that Cary's decision is thus ethical according to both consequentialism and virtue ethics.
A similar example could be constructed for Denny Deontologist, who, by deploying deontological ethics in a particular scenario, demonstrates his moral character and thus satisfies both deonotology and virtue ethics.
On the other hand, recall that deontological decisions are based on an application of the rules. If the rules are established by consistently applying a principle of rights, such as "the greatest good for the greatest number," then those rules are simultaneously deontological and consequential.
For this reason, we might consider The Golden Rule to be an incarnation of both consequentialism and deontology. It is not at all surprising to note that The Golden Rule is often cited by practitioners of both forms of ethics. The deontologists like it, because it is rule-based, and often rooted in theism. The consequentialists like it because, if it is consistently applied, it leads to maximal utility.
A final complication here is that, indeed, every ethical guideline is utilitarian if it is applied consistently and unanimously. Nothing can be deemed unethical if every actor is assumed to agree with every other actor about what the most ethical course of action might be. Hence, if every man is a Christ-like Christian, then utility is maximized. (And, I might add, everyone's virtue is consistent with virtue ethics in that case as well.)
In truth, no one person subscribes wholly to one ethical system. We all prefer utilitarian arguments for certain moral problems, deonotological arguments for other problems, and virtue ethics for others still. Human ethics are frequently a blend of all three approaches. During ethical disputes, we will often try to convince the person we are disputing with one set of principles, and then switch to another set when that argument proves unconvincing.
Ethical Disputes
Deontologists can argue among themselves about whose application of a rule is the most consistent with the spirit of that rule. Hence, we observe many colorful debates among libertarians regarding the Non-Aggression Principle. Consequentialists can argue among themselves about what are the relevant consequences worth analyzing in a particular dilemma. Hence, we observe many colorful debates among conservatives regarding the impact immigration might have on the nation. Virtue ethicists can argue among themselves about what is the exact moral character of the actor facing a dilemma, and whether his motives are fundamentally good or bad ones. Hence, we observe leftists as they debate the relative merits of Obama's thug-headed surveillance decisions.
But a deontologist cannot argue with a consequentialist about the application of rules unless and until the consequentialist accepts the premise that rule must be applied. Likewise, that consequentialist will never convince the deontologist that "the end justifies the means" in a moral dilemma if the "means" involves a violation of the deontologist's "rule." And no set of rules or consequences will ever absolve a guilty party if a virtue ethicist has deemed that party's virtue to be substandard.
Thus, ethical discussions can only be had by people who are applying the same ethical principle to the dilemma in question. Each approach has its own moral reasoning that is fundamentally incompatible with the reasoning of other approaches to normative ethics.
The Normative Ethics Fallacy
In political discussions, we frequently see pundits making arguments based on one ethical approach and then changing their ethical approach mid-way through the argument. The argument itself never changes, but the underlying justification for it does.
Gun control advocates, for example, frequently begin by stating the principle that a natural right to keep and bear arms should not compromise a natural right to life: the deontological rules are in conflict. When gun control opponents respond to this argument with natural rights arguments of their own, the gun control advocates will respond with statistics on how many gun-related deaths occur each year. The greatest good is not being served under the current set of regulations. When their opponents respond with their own set of statistics and applications of utility, the advocates will respond that there is no justifiable reason for citizens to own particular kinds of weapons. Thus the virtues of gun owners are being called into question under a virtue ethics scheme. When opponents respond with virtue arguments of their own, the gun control advocates return to their original claims about natural rights.
While each individual point made by gun control advocates is ethically consistent, all points taken as a whole represent a fallacious application of ethical logic.
If something is ethically wrong because of a rule, then that is the reason it is wrong. If something is wrong because it fails to maximize utility, then that is the reason it is wrong. If something is wrong because it calls a person's virtue into question, then that is the reason. To argue all three points to three different people might also be consistent, so long as one sticks to one set of reasoning with any one person.
But it is fallacious and wrong to change one's system of normative ethics when its logic is called into question, merely in order to continue making the same point. For any issue, once a person has chosen their set of ethical reasoning, to change one's moral reasoning when that reasoning proves to be problematic is disingenuous and creates bad faith in the discussion.
Even worse: To change one's underlying moral reasoning when the reasoning proves to be inadequate is to fail to adhere to one's moral principles. If you believe X for reason Y only up until the point that Y is demonstrated to be insufficient to uphold your reasoning, then switching to reason Z proves that your reasoning is not based on any kind of moral knowledge at all.
If you did that, you'd be engaged in rationalization. You'd simply be using any available argument to justify that which is not justifiable. All you'd really be demonstrating is a lack of principles.
Conclusion
Getting back to the Cowen quote above, it is indeed possible that presidents change their underlying moral reasoning upon gaining the presidency. However, for reasons I have just provided, if they do so they have demonstrated a complete lack of morality. In that case, Cowen's hypothesis must be rejected, since it is contingent on the actor being moral. The hypothesis is equivalent to the statement that presidents change their moral behaviors at different points in time because they never had any moral character to begin with. In the case of Barack Obama, I would have to agree.
The key points to take away from this article are:
Presidents must live with a great sense of responsibility for their decisions, and this [potentially] makes them more utilitarian and less deontological. Arguably the same is true of CEOs of major companies, and of the major characters in the new Superman movie. Superman seems willing to toss around infrastructure to increase his chance of taking out some bad guys, and none of the viewers in the Angelika Mosaic multiplex seemed to find this implausible or undesirable.But does utilitarianism exist on a continuum with deontology, such that as you practice one to a greater degree, you can no longer practice the other?
The Main Ethical Systems
There are three main categories of "normative ethics," as follows:
- Deontology is often also called "rule-based" ethics. The rules can be established by, for example, a deity whose commandments represent the final word on ethics. For this reason, many theists apply deontology to their ethical decisions. It need not be a theist ethical system, though. John Locke's "natural rights" theories are often said to be deontological, since they are ultimately traced to a foundational principle (natural rights) that governs subsequent ethical analysis.
- Consequentialism is the system of ethics that grows out of analysis of a course of action's consequences. Of this, there are many varieties. Utilitarianism, "the greatest good for the greatest number," is a form of consequentialism because the underlying decision is based on determining how many people benefit from that decision. Although there are other sub-categories of consequentialism, the easiest way to think about them is that they are all a form of Utilitarianism, where "utility" is defined specifically as "economic utility," or "love," or "preference," or etc.
- Virtue ethics is a system of ethics that emphasizes the character of the actor, rather than the particular decision itself. This form of ethics was basically invented by Aristotle, and subsequent advocates for virtue ethics (like Thomas Aquinas) have rested their arguments mostly on Aristotle's original ideas.
A few days ago, I used the example of lying in an application of virtue ethics. More concisely, we can look at it as follows:
- A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, because it is always dishonest. There is a "rule" here that governs the deontologist's position: Lying is said to be wrong, and wrong is bad, hence lying in any circumstance is always unethical.
- A consequentialist, by contrast, might argue that lying is perfectly ethical if it leads positive consequences. If by lying you make a person happier at no cost to anyone else, then the lie had a net good impact, and was thus more ethical than a potentially abrasive truth. A different situation might change the decision. In some instances, one might lie, and in others one might not.
- A virtue ethicist would examine a person's motives in lying. If the liar lied purely for personal gain, or to make another person suffer, or to otherwise cause trouble, then the lie was clearly unethical. If, however, a person lied to save a child's life, or to maintain a good relationship with someone, then his or her motives were virtuous, and the lie would not be deemed unethical.
Complicating And Criss-Crossing
The greater scrutiny we apply to normative ethical theories, the more the lines between them blur. Let me illustrate this by again using lying as our ethical example.
If a person's moral character is to be analyzed in applications of virtue ethics, then motives matter. If the person being analyzed subscribes to deontology or consequentialism, then - according to virtue ethics - his or her motives are virtuous.
Suppose Cary Consequentialist lies in order to take the blame for a conspiracy committed by his five closest family members. His decision to lie and accept responsibility for a crime he didn't commit is fully consistent with utilitarianism: His family members are spared punishment, while justice is served for society at large. No one suffers except Cary, who does so in order to maximize utility. But note that Cary's decision is thus ethical according to both consequentialism and virtue ethics.
A similar example could be constructed for Denny Deontologist, who, by deploying deontological ethics in a particular scenario, demonstrates his moral character and thus satisfies both deonotology and virtue ethics.
On the other hand, recall that deontological decisions are based on an application of the rules. If the rules are established by consistently applying a principle of rights, such as "the greatest good for the greatest number," then those rules are simultaneously deontological and consequential.
For this reason, we might consider The Golden Rule to be an incarnation of both consequentialism and deontology. It is not at all surprising to note that The Golden Rule is often cited by practitioners of both forms of ethics. The deontologists like it, because it is rule-based, and often rooted in theism. The consequentialists like it because, if it is consistently applied, it leads to maximal utility.
A final complication here is that, indeed, every ethical guideline is utilitarian if it is applied consistently and unanimously. Nothing can be deemed unethical if every actor is assumed to agree with every other actor about what the most ethical course of action might be. Hence, if every man is a Christ-like Christian, then utility is maximized. (And, I might add, everyone's virtue is consistent with virtue ethics in that case as well.)
In truth, no one person subscribes wholly to one ethical system. We all prefer utilitarian arguments for certain moral problems, deonotological arguments for other problems, and virtue ethics for others still. Human ethics are frequently a blend of all three approaches. During ethical disputes, we will often try to convince the person we are disputing with one set of principles, and then switch to another set when that argument proves unconvincing.
Ethical Disputes
Deontologists can argue among themselves about whose application of a rule is the most consistent with the spirit of that rule. Hence, we observe many colorful debates among libertarians regarding the Non-Aggression Principle. Consequentialists can argue among themselves about what are the relevant consequences worth analyzing in a particular dilemma. Hence, we observe many colorful debates among conservatives regarding the impact immigration might have on the nation. Virtue ethicists can argue among themselves about what is the exact moral character of the actor facing a dilemma, and whether his motives are fundamentally good or bad ones. Hence, we observe leftists as they debate the relative merits of Obama's thug-headed surveillance decisions.
But a deontologist cannot argue with a consequentialist about the application of rules unless and until the consequentialist accepts the premise that rule must be applied. Likewise, that consequentialist will never convince the deontologist that "the end justifies the means" in a moral dilemma if the "means" involves a violation of the deontologist's "rule." And no set of rules or consequences will ever absolve a guilty party if a virtue ethicist has deemed that party's virtue to be substandard.
Thus, ethical discussions can only be had by people who are applying the same ethical principle to the dilemma in question. Each approach has its own moral reasoning that is fundamentally incompatible with the reasoning of other approaches to normative ethics.
The Normative Ethics Fallacy
In political discussions, we frequently see pundits making arguments based on one ethical approach and then changing their ethical approach mid-way through the argument. The argument itself never changes, but the underlying justification for it does.
Gun control advocates, for example, frequently begin by stating the principle that a natural right to keep and bear arms should not compromise a natural right to life: the deontological rules are in conflict. When gun control opponents respond to this argument with natural rights arguments of their own, the gun control advocates will respond with statistics on how many gun-related deaths occur each year. The greatest good is not being served under the current set of regulations. When their opponents respond with their own set of statistics and applications of utility, the advocates will respond that there is no justifiable reason for citizens to own particular kinds of weapons. Thus the virtues of gun owners are being called into question under a virtue ethics scheme. When opponents respond with virtue arguments of their own, the gun control advocates return to their original claims about natural rights.
While each individual point made by gun control advocates is ethically consistent, all points taken as a whole represent a fallacious application of ethical logic.
If something is ethically wrong because of a rule, then that is the reason it is wrong. If something is wrong because it fails to maximize utility, then that is the reason it is wrong. If something is wrong because it calls a person's virtue into question, then that is the reason. To argue all three points to three different people might also be consistent, so long as one sticks to one set of reasoning with any one person.
But it is fallacious and wrong to change one's system of normative ethics when its logic is called into question, merely in order to continue making the same point. For any issue, once a person has chosen their set of ethical reasoning, to change one's moral reasoning when that reasoning proves to be problematic is disingenuous and creates bad faith in the discussion.
Even worse: To change one's underlying moral reasoning when the reasoning proves to be inadequate is to fail to adhere to one's moral principles. If you believe X for reason Y only up until the point that Y is demonstrated to be insufficient to uphold your reasoning, then switching to reason Z proves that your reasoning is not based on any kind of moral knowledge at all.
If you did that, you'd be engaged in rationalization. You'd simply be using any available argument to justify that which is not justifiable. All you'd really be demonstrating is a lack of principles.
Conclusion
Getting back to the Cowen quote above, it is indeed possible that presidents change their underlying moral reasoning upon gaining the presidency. However, for reasons I have just provided, if they do so they have demonstrated a complete lack of morality. In that case, Cowen's hypothesis must be rejected, since it is contingent on the actor being moral. The hypothesis is equivalent to the statement that presidents change their moral behaviors at different points in time because they never had any moral character to begin with. In the case of Barack Obama, I would have to agree.
The key points to take away from this article are:
- There are three main approaches to moral dilemmas.
- In general, people prefer different approaches to different kinds of dilemmas.
- To change one's approach in the middle of a debate is to demonstrate a lack of moral character.
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